The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory by Black, Barbara
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1988
The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label
in Search of a Theory
Barbara Black
Pace Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Black, Barbara, "The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of a Theory" (1988). Pace Law Faculty Publications. Paper
13.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/13
THE STRANGE CASE OF FRAUD ON THE MARKET: 
A LABEL IN SEARCH OF A THEORY 
Barbara Black* 
Reflecting its haphazard origins,' rule lob-5 has developed a split 
personality. At its most elemental, it is simply the federal securities 
laws' equivalent of the common law tort of deceit.2 But it has also 
become a complex, wide-ranging remedy, extending beyond common 
law, available to injured  investor^.^ Nowhere is the confusion sur- 
*Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Barnard College; J.D., Columbia 
University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of James 
J. Fishman and Margaret V. Sachs and the research assistance of David Varoli, Pace Law 
School Class of 1989. 
Rule lob-5 was hastily adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942, pursuant 
to its authority under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to enable it to 
bring enforcement actions against corporate insiders who committed fraud in the purchase of 
securities. See 15 U.S.C. 8 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. 1 240.10b-5 (1988). The circumstances of 
its adoption are recounted in ABA Section of Corp., Banking and Bus. Law, Conference on 
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967) (remarks of Milton 
Freeman) (recalling the now infamous statement of Commissioner Sumner Pike during the 
decision to adopt rule lob-5: " 'Well,' he said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?' "). 
Federal courts consistently have implied a private cause of action under section 10(b) and 
rule lob-5, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 
1946). The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of a private claim in a footnote in 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), remarking 
that "[ilt is now established that a private right of action is implied under 8 10(b)." See also 
Basic Inc, v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (noting that "filudicial interpretation and 
application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a 
private cause of action exists for a violation of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, and constitutes 
an essential tool for the enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements"). 
2See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (what rule lob-5 catches must be 
common law fraud); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Section 10 was built 
on, and retained, many of the characteristics of the common law tort action of deceit"); 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547 n.21 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (noting 
that "[tlhe implied cause of action under Rule lob-5 'is essentially a tort claim,' derived from 
the common case action of deceit" (citation omitted)), afd in part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 
(1983); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 269-70 (1972) (claiming that the 
elements of common law fraud are often deemed necessary for liability under rule lob-5). Note, 
The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Ruk lob-5, 
24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363, 366-69 (1973) (discussing the common law foundations of rule 
lob-5); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Ruk lob-5, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 584, 584-85 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Reliance] (noting that "it is not surprising that 
the common law tort of deceit has provided the foundation for developing the compensatory 
aspects of the right of action under the rule" (footnote omitted)). But see id. at  585 & n.7 
(recognizing that courts have taken rule lob-5 well beyond its common law birthplace). 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,382 (1983). In Huddkston, Justice Marshall, 
writing for the majority, noted that "a 5 10(b) action can be brought by a purchaser or seller 
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rounding rule lob-5 more evident than in the judicial treatment of 
the role of reliance. 
To recover in fraud at  common law, a plaintiff must establish both 
his reliance upon a misrepresentation4 and the loss caused by that 
re:liance.b The function of the reliance element is to establish causation 
in fact.6 Only if the misrepresentation induced the plaintiff to enter 
the transaction is there causation in fact. In addition, plaintiff must 
establish that the misrepresentation was a legal cause of his loss by 
establishing that the loss might reasonably be expected to result from 
the re l i an~e .~  In other words, plaintiff must establish that the untruth 
was the proximate cause of his injury. 
In open market securities transactions not involving direct com- 
munication between the maker of the misrepresentation and the 
investor, the common law's treatment of reliance as a sine qua, non 
of recovery presents difficulties for plaintiffs. Purchasers, for example, 
who did not read a misrepresentation that inflated the value of the 
stock, and who did not even know about it, may be injured by the 
fraud if they bought the stock at  the inflated price. Decision after 
decision recites the common law that reliance is a crucial element 
in every rule lob-5 cause of action.8 Other cases inform us that the 
reliance requirement's only purpose is to establish causation,g and 
of 'any security' against 'any person' who has used 'any manipulative or deceptive device or 
colltrivance' in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
78j (emphasis added by the Court)); see also id. a t  388-89 ("the antifraud provisions of the 
securities law are not co-extensive with common law doctrines of fraud"). 
"Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 
52!5 (1976); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 8 108 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term, supra note 2, a t  269. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 537; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, 110, a t  
767; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, a t  270. 
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 546; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, 110, at 
767. 
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 548A; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, 8 110, a t  
767; Note, Torts: Deceit: Determination and Measurement of Damnges, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 356, 
358 (1955). 
See, e.g., Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 
787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 
734 F.2d 740, 742 ( l l t h  Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Huddleston 
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547-48 (5th Cir. Unit: A Mar. 1981) (en banc) (noting 
that "reliance is an issue in all Rule lob-5 cases" (emphasis in original)), a f d  in part, rev'd 
in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Dwoskin v. Rollins, Inc., 634 F.2d 285, 291 n.4 (5th Cir. Jan. 
1981); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 551 (1st Cir. 1978). 
*See, e.g., Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 992 ( l l t h  Cir.) ("reliance established 
'but for' causation"), vacated and reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 ( l l t h  Cir. 1988); Flamm v. 
Etientadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir.) (" 'reliance' means only materiality and causation in 
conjunction"); cf. Lipton, 734 F.2d at 742 (stating that to "[r]equir[e] the plaintiff to show that 
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that causation can be shown in other ways. 
The hornbook rules on reliance in a rule lob-5 action are so bizarre 
that one must suspend one's analytical processes to recite them. 
Generally, reliance is an element that a plaintiff must prove in 
establishing a right to recovery.1° If plaintiff's claim is based on a 
misrepresentation, the plaintiff usually must show reliance upon the 
misrepresentation.ll But if plaintiff's claim is based on a failure to 
disclose, reliance is presumed, and the defendant must establish 
plaintiff's nonreliance in order to rebut the presumption.12 Plaintiff 
need not establish reliance in this case because it is "too hard" to 
prove he relied on silence.13 Since a failure to tell the complete truth, 
the basis of most securities fraud cases, can be viewed either as a 
nondisclosure or as an affirmative untruth,14 considerable litigation 
has concerned the characterization of the misstatements. Courts gen- 
erally treat these "mixed" cases as cases involving misrepresenta- 
tions.16 
Fraud on the market has been superimposed on these traditional 
rules of reliance. In certain circumstances plaintiff does not have to 
prove that he relied on the misstatements, no matter how they are 
characterized.16 He is instead benefitted by a presumption that he 
relied on the integrity of the market for the shares. Development of 
fraud on the market reflects the ambivalence toward the appropriate 
he reasonably relied on the defendants' misrepresentations is a means of establishing the 'casual 
link between the misrepresentation or omission and the injuries suffered by the private plaintiff' " 
(quoting Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)). 
'Osee Ross, 837 F.2d a t  992; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton, 
734 F.2d a t  742; Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 170 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 
(1974); Sheftelman v. Jones, 667 F. Supp. 859, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
11 See Harris, 787 F.2d at 366; Caravan Mobil Home Sales v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 
769 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1985); Zorbrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 
1983); Huddleston, 640 F.2d a t  547; Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978). 
12See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972); Ross, 837 F.2d 
a t  992. In some jurisdictions, this presumption of reliance is applicable only if defendant had 
a duty to disclose to plaintiff. See Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749, 756 (11th 
Cir. 1984); Rifkin, 574 F.2d a t  260-62 & n.1; Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 
549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. 
Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Sew., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 262 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978). 
Is ROSS, 837 F.2d a t  992 (noting that "[tlhe presumption is employed because it is so difficult 
for a plaintiff to prove a negative"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373-74 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). 
14 See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1119 (5th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 
57 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1989) (No. 88-1506). 
15 See, e.g., id. a t  1119; Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 548. 
16See generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with ~eliance Re- 
quirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1984). 
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role of reliance. Its meaning and the questions it raises about the 
role of reliance and causation in rule lob-5 claims are major unresolved 
issues in rule lob-5 jurisprudence. 
Fraud on the market is frequently explained as conferring upon 
the plaintiff a rebuttable presumption of reliance" without much 
analysis of how the presumption can be rebutted. This is the tra- 
ditional tort law explanation, referred to in this Article as reliance- 
based fraud on the market, or as the reliance approach. An alternative 
e:rplanation of fraud on the market is that it eliminates reliance as 
a required element and places the analytical emphasis where it belongs: 
on causation. This is causation-based fraud on the market, also 
referred to as the pure causation approach. Under this pure causation 
approach, plaintiffs who were injured by the fraud can recover, despite 
their lack of reliance. Although to date many courts have been 
u:nwilling to articulate such a significant departure from common law 
tort principles, all the leading fraud on the market cases, including 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,la can be 
interpreted as supporting this approach. In the pages that follow, it 
is suggested that fraud on the market is best conceptualized in terms 
of this pure causation approach instead of the more frequently used 
reliance approach. 
Part I of this Article will briefly discuss fraud on the market as a 
label attached to different factual situations, analyzing Blackie v. 
Barrack19 and Shores u. Sklar20 as two paradigms of the label's 
application. Part I1 will discuss the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Basic. It concludes that the Court did not analyze definitively fraud 
on the market, thus leaving open the possibility that a pure causation 
approach is an appropriate explanation of fraud on the market. The 
treatment and application of fraud on the market in the lower courts 
is next analyzed in three groups: those applying Blackie, those applying 
Shores, and finally those involving a classic form of market manip- 
ulation. In each instance, the significance of a pure causation approach 
l7 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 
11.61 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. May 1981), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. 
Mlass. 1988); Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118 F.R.D. 136, 142 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Klein 
v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 646, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., 
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,274 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1985); 
Greenwald v. Integrated Energy, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 65, 68 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
l8 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). 
19524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
"647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). 
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is discussed. The Article will conclude that fraud on the market is 
best used as a means of focusing on causation, and in some situations, 
dispensing with the reliance requirement. 
I. FRAUD O N  THE MARKET: Bluckie u. Barrack AND 
Shores u. Sklur 
Fraud on the marketz1 permits plaintiffs who concededly did not 
read the fraudulent misstatements to recover. While the origins of 
fraud on the market can be traced back at  least to the enactment 
of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,22 its rapid acceptance in 
recent years is largely attributable to two significant influences on 
securities law: economic theory and class action procedure. The "ef- 
ficient capital market hypothesis," or the efficient market thesis, states 
that in free and actively traded markets, stock prices reflect fully all 
available information about the value of a corporation.23 The market 
"transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a 
market price . . . [and acts] as the unpaid agent of the investor, 
informing him that given all the information available to it, the value 
of the stock is worth the market price."24 Fraud on the market also 
provides a means of eliminating individual issues of reliance which 
would make securities fraud class actions impracticable, since under 
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure questions of 
law or fact common to all members of the class must predominate 
over questions affecting only individual members.26 Courts most fre- 
2' "Fraud on the Market," as an independent phrase, made its jurisprudential debut in Herbst 
v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The origins and background of fraud on the market 
are analyzed extensively in my earlier article, Black, supra note 16, a t  435, and so will not be 
repeated here. The purpose of this article is to refine the analysis of my earlier article and to 
concentrate on developments after the date of that article. 
22 15 U.S.C. 5 77k (1982). Section 11 permits purchasers of shares issued under a registration 
statement to recover for material misstatements in the registration statement, whether or not 
they read the misstatement. Id. For discussion of the legislative history of the express remedy 
provisions in both acts, see Black, supra note 16, a t  462-65. See also Berle, Liability for Stock 
Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 269 & n.9 (1931) (asserting that any buyers 
relying on the state of the market should be able to recover for misstatements which cause the 
market to arrive at  a false valuation for the stock). 
For a brief explanation of the efficient capital market hypothesis that is intelligible to 
laymen, see Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSIS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, 
at  55 (excerpted in R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION 156 (1980)). 
% I n  re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
2 5 F ~ ~ .  R. CIV. P. 23, The rule states in part: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder 
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qi~ently refer to fraud on the market as establishing a rebuttable 
p~resumption of reliance. Examined in this light, the concept of fraud 
on the market does not eliminate the requirement of reliance; it just 
does not require plaintiff to talk about it. 
Although the Supreme Court and virtually every circuit court has 
acknowledged the existence of a fraud on the market theory,26 it is 
not a theory at all, but rather a label attached to some distinctly 
d:ifferent factual situations. Its two most widely recognized forms are 
identified by the decisions which enunciated their version of fraud 
o:n the market: the Ninth Circuit's Blackie v. Bar r~ck2~  and the Fifth 
C,ircuit's Shores v. S k l ~ r . ~ 8  In Blackie, plaintiffs had purchased shares 
o:€ the corporation's stock in an actively traded secondary market.29 
They alleged that about forty-five documents released publicly by the 
corporation contained material misstatements that artificially inflated 
the price of the stock.30 The Ninth Circuit held that in rule lob-5 
claims involving open market transactions individual members of the 
c:lass did not have to prove their own reliance on the misstatements.31 
According to the court, material misstatements have an impact on 
the trading price of the stock.32 Therefore, every investor who relies 
on the market's ability to determine the value of the stock based on 
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
. of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
. . . .  
(3) the court finds that the question of law or fact common to the members of the ,class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 
20 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 
367 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 
1179-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d a t  1160; Levinson 
v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988); Harris v. Union 
Eilec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. Documation, 
Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons v. 
Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
1J.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 471 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 
358 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
z7524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
28647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). 
29 524 F.2d a t  906. 
30 Id. at  902. 
31 Id. at  906. 
32 Id. at  905-06. 
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the publicly available information has relied on those misstatements, 
even though he may have no direct knowledge of them.33 
Shores v. S k l ~ r 3 ~  involved an initial offering of revenue bonds where 
there was no well-developed secondary market.36 The bonds dropped 
drastically in value shortly after their sale because of the default by 
the lessee of the industrial business prerni~es.3~ The purchaser, de- 
ceased by the time of the litigation, had not read the offering circular, 
but had apparently relied on his broker's recommendations in pur- 
chasing the bonds.37 The Fifth Circuit held that although the pur- 
chaser's failure to read the offering circular barred his executor from 
asserting a claim based on alleged material misstatements in the 
offering circular, it did not prevent him from asserting a claim based 
on the fraud of bringing to market bonds which were unmarketable 
absent such fraud, so long as the purchaser had relied on "the integrity 
of the offerings of the securities market."38 
Before proceeding, one must pause to marvel at  the malleability 
of any theory that can encompass two such disparate factual situations. 
Because the securities in Blackie were actively and widely traded, the 
court emphasized the efficient market thesis and its view that the 
market price is an indicator of value upon which most investors rely.39 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not need to eliminate the reliance re- 
quirement; rather, it took the approach that reliance could be indirect, 
and plaintiffs need not establish that they read the misstatements. 
Indirect actual reliance could be presumed, but the presumption was 
rebuttable. In contrast, the efficient market thesis has no bearing in 
Shores, and so the Fifth Circuit could not look to the price of the 
bonds as conveying a value upon which the investor relied. Although 
the court used the term reliance'40 the focus was solely on causation; 
plaintiffs suffered injury caused by the defendants' fraud, i.e., the 
marketing of worthless bonds.41 In a Shores case, once plaintiffs 
33 Id. a t  907. 
"647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). 
35 Id. at  467. The record was unclear whether the buyer bought directly from the bond issuer 
or from his broker. However, the district court found that, regardless of the means of the sale, 
the purchase was part of the primary offering. Id. 
38 Id. a t  463-64. 
97 Id. at  467. 
* I d .  a t  469. 
39 B h k i e ,  524 F.2d a t  907. "A purchaser on the stock exchanges . . . relies generally on the 
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has 
artifically inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying 
the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misre- 
presentations." Id. 
'0 Shores, 647 F.2d a t  464. 
'1 Id. at  466. 
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establish that the defendants fraudulently offered unmarketable se- 
curities, it is not at  all clear that the defendants can avoid liability. 
Bringing the worthless securities to market caused the purchasers' 
injury, and seldom will there be an intervening factor significant 
e:nough to break the chain of causation. Indeed, the only common 
thread running through Blackie and Shores is that they were both 
c:lass action cases. Thus, the theory of fraud on the market, if there 
it; one, may be simply an explanation to eliminate the necessity of 
dealing with reliance issues whenever there is a securities fraud class 
action. 
Shores, however, has been frequently criticized both because it 
applied fraud on the market to an initial public offering where there 
was no well developed secondary market, and because it permitted 
recovery on a showing of causation only.42 As a result, its continued 
existence is in doubt.43 If Shores is disregarded, then fraud on the 
market, following Blackie, might be described simply as an approach 
which establishes a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 
Application of fraud on the market has not been limited, however, 
to class actions or situations explainable in terms of a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance. While Blackie can be interpreted simply as 
a case involving indirect actual reliance,44 it can also be viewed as a 
pure causation case.46 The Blackie court recognized that a misstate- 
rnent made in a well-developed trading market will be picked up by 
traders following the stock and have an impact on the price of the 
stock,46 thus causing all traders injury.47 Blackie can also be explained 
4z See, e.g., 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, ECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, 
$ 8.6(642) (1988) (describing Shores as the "most controversial example" of the fraud on the 
market theory as applied to an undeveloped market). 
43 See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text (discussing uncertain status of Shores in the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits). 
In open market transactions, the purchaser indirectly relies on the accuracy of public 
information about a corporation because he relies on the "supposition that the market price is 
validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artifically inflated the price." Blackie, 524 
1?.2d a t  907. 
46 See, e.g., Panzirer, 663 F.2d at 368; Black, supra note 16, at 448; see also Schlick v. Penn- 
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (in 
i~hich the court focused on causation). 
'6 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907. 
"Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were injured by the artificial inflation of the value 
of the stock. See Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In Packer, the court 
r ~ o k  the position that plaintiffs did not establish any injury resulting from the purchase a t  an 
~dlegedly inflated value, since they alleged an ongoing conspiracy to inflate the price. Id. a t  
1240. Moreover, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, not damages, to cure the misstatements which 
the court observed would cause them injury. The court evidently viewed the complaint as 
:founded on corporate mismanagement and therefore barred under Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 
,430 U.S. 462 (1977). See Packer, 630 F. Supp. a t  1243. 
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as a case in which the fraud is viewed, not as misstatements, but as 
fraud on a larger scale, or market manipulation, where plaintiff need 
only prove that the actions caused him injury.48 Furthermore, there 
are other decisions that can be explained only in terms of causation: 
a recognition that investors can be injured by a misstatement even 
though they did not rely on it. In Panzirer v. Wolf,49 for example, 
the Second Circuit invoked fraud on the market to allow a claim by 
a purchaser who said she bought stock in a corporation after a Wall 
Street Journal article predicted favorable corporate developments, 
which, she argued, would not have been written if the adverse in- 
formation had been disclosed.60 Although the Supreme Court's recent 
opinion in Basic Inc. v. Le~inson6~ accepted the use of fraud on the 
market to give class members a rebuttable presumption of reliance, 
it gives us no guidance as to when, if ever, fraud on the market can 
be used to eliminate the requirement of reliance altogether. 
11. THE Basic DECISION 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,62 like Blackie v. Barrack,63 involved a class 
action, but its facts present the other side of the coin. The plaintiffs 
in Basic, former holders of shares traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange, alleged that the corporation issued materially misleading 
press releases about merger negotiations that depressed the price of 
the securities.64 In cases like Blackie, in which plaintiff alleges an 
artificial inflation in the price of the stock, misstatements that are 
intentionally made to inflate the price by themselves establish market 
manipulation,65 because corporate management has an obvious interest 
in keeping the price of the stock high. In contrast, when the mis- 
statements depress the stock price, as in Basic, it is difficult, without 
additional evidence of market manipulation (such as insider trading), 
to believe that management intended to do this. Without proof of 
wrongful intent, actions in which the market price is depressed will 
fail by reason of plaintiff's inability to establish the requisite scienter. 
"See, e.g., Fausett v. American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-39 (D. Utah 
1982). 
48663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982). 
* I d .  at 367. 
108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). 
52 Id. 
m524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. 
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907. 
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Thus, because stock price depression cases will largely turn on scienter 
and not reliance or causation, the more common Blackie-type case 
of artificial inflation of the market price would have allowed for a 
more meaningful examination of fraud on the market. Basic was 
therefore a poor choice of a case for the Supreme Court's review of 
t.hese issues. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided, by a 4-2 vote, that it was proper 
for the lower courts to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance.66 
I n  fact, the Court decided little, because Justice Blackmun made it 
clear that he was not "assess[ing] the general validity of the [fraud 
on the market] theory."67 Instead, he threw the development of the 
theory back to the lower courts so they could continue to struggle 
with it.68 
In finding the presumption of reliance proper, Justice Blackmun 
set forth six reasons commonly offered by the lower courts to support 
a. presumption of reliance, and analyzed them in a cursory fashion. 
One was the "class action" explanation: requiring proof of individual 
reliance would prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with a class action, 
since individual issues would overwhelm the common ones.69 Another 
reason was an expansion of the view in Affiliated Ute Citizens u. 
IJnited States@ that plaintiffs should have the benefit of a presumption 
because it is difficult for them to establish reliance on silence.61 
Requiring a plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market to 
show a speculative state of facts would place on him "an unnecessarily 
unrealistic evidentiary burden."62 Neither of these two explanations 
~tddressed the substantive elements of securities fraud claims. 
Three of the reasons given by Justice Blackmun suggested that at  
rnost only lip service need be given to the reliance requirement. First, 
while reliance is an element in rule lob-5 claims, there are other 
ways to establish the causal connection between defendant's mis- 
statements and plaintiff's injury.63 Second, transactions in the modern 
securities markets differ from the face-to-face transactions contem- 
plated in the early fraud cases, and the reliance requirement should 
reflect these differences.64 Third, the presumption of reliance is con- 
66 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993. 
Id. at 989. 
68 But see 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 42, 8.6(611) ("[tlhe Supreme Court 
endorsed the fraud-on-the-market-theory 4-2 in Basic"). 
59 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989. 
"406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
Basic, 108 S .  Ct. at 990. 
EZ Id. 
s3 Id. at 989. 
Id. at 989-90. 
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sistent with and supports the congressional policy embodied in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in which Congress enacted legislation 
on the express premise that the securities markets are affected by 
information.66 But for Justice Blackmun's acknowledgment that "re- 
liance is an element of a Rule lob-5 cause of action,"66 these reasons 
might be interpreted to eliminate the reliance requirement altogether. 
Justice Blackmun's last reason is mere rhetoric: the presumption is 
supported by common sense and probability, because no one " 'would 
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game.' "67 
Justice Blackmun did little to dispel the essential confusion sur- 
rounding fraud on the market: what do courts mean by a "rebuttable 
presumption" of reliance? If reliance is an indispensable element in 
a kclle lob-5 action, why should courts presume its existence? There 
are two possible explanations. First, once the lie is out in the mar- 
ketplace, an investor who does not read the lie in its original form 
may nevertheless be influenced by it. He may read a newspaper article 
which was affected by the lie, or he may speak to a broker or an 
acquaintance who read the lie or heard about it from someone else. 
This sort of indirect actual reliance is both common and appropriate, 
but difficult for the investor to establish with specificity. Although 
the investor could certainly testify to the best of his recollection on 
how the investment decision was made, it may be appropriate for 
the courts simply to dispense with this proof. 
Second, once the lie is out in the marketplace, a trader who has 
not relied on it in any way is affected by it if other traders have 
taken the lie into account in making their trading decisions, since 
the price at  which the nonrelying trader trades is arrived at  through 
the trades of the relying traders. The price of the stock is determined 
by the totality of information in the marketplace, correct or incorrect, 
if that information has been picked up and relied upon by traders 
in the stock. The validity of that statement is generally attributed 
to the efficient market thesis.* The fact that trades affect stock prices, 
however, is unrelated to the efficient market thesis, as is the fact 
that traders act upon the available information. In fact, full acceptance 
of the efficient market thesis would lead to skepticism that false 
information could have any significant impact on stock prices, since 
66 Id. at 990-91. 
Id. at 989. 
67 Id. at 991 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
68See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143-45 & n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
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traders should recognize its falsity and disregard it.69 Traditionally, 
~nanipulation of stock prices has been a greater .problem with less 
widely traded securities; where a stock has few market makers and 
few analysts following it, it is easier for a misstatement to have a 
dramatic impact on the stock price. It is thus appropriate for the 
courts to minimize the question of individual reliance, and focus on 
the question of whether the misstatement had an impact on stock 
prices, taking into account other information available in the mar- 
ketplace. Thus, the focus should be on materiality and causation. 
Under the second explanation, causation, not reliance, is the rel- 
evant inquiry. This view of fraud on the market as a pure causation 
theory recognizes that an investor's injury can be caused by a mis- 
statement on which he did not rely, a view that common law tort 
:law did not accept.70 
The key issue in determining the scope of fraud on the market is 
'how to rebut the presumption of reliance.71 The more difficult it is 
for a defendant to rebut this presumption, the more closely fraud on 
,the market resembles a pure causation approach than an indirect 
actual reliance approach. According to Justice Blackmun, "[alny show- 
ing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and 
. . . [the investor's] decision to trade at  a fair market price"72 would 
rebut the presumption. The Sixth Circuit in Basic said the defendant 
could rebut the presumption by showing that an individual plaintiff 
would have traded even if he knew the truth.73 Justice Blackmun 
gave several situations in which the presumption could be rebutted, 
69 For criticism of the efficient capital markets hypothesis applied to law, see Basic, 108 S. 
Ct. at  994-96 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The fact that every few years 
there are massive frauds uncovered, like the ones involving National Student Marketing and 
Equity Funding, leads to skepticism about the efficient capital market thesis. See Wachovia 
Bank & Trust, Co., N.A. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); In  re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 1266 (C.D. Cal. 
1975). 
7O~he common law reauirement is well stated bv the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "If the 
recipient [of a fraudulent'mi~re~resentation] does not in fact rely on the misrepresentation, the 
fact that he takes some action that would be consistent with his reliance on it and as a result 
suffers pecuniary loss, does not impose any liability upon the maker." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS, 5 537, comment a. Justice White, in his opinion in Basic, admonished the majority 
for turning its back on the common law precepts of fraud, stating that "the Court, I fear, 
embarks on a course that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences it cannot 
foresee." Basic, 108 S. Ct. at  995 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote 
omitted). 
7' For a comprehensive discussion of how various courts have addressed the rebuttable pre- 
sumption created by the fraud on the market hypothesis, see 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, 
supra note 42, 5 8.6(600-62). 
72 Basic, 108 S. Ct. a t  992. 
73 Id. 
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including situations in which sellers who believed that the price was 
artificially low but nonetheless were forced to sell, either because of 
a court order or political pressure to divest themselves of the stock.74 
But even under a pure causation approach, these sellers should not 
be able to recover because they did not rely on the integrity of the 
market, but rather consciously rejected the market price. On the other 
hand, a plaintiff who decides to sell because he needs money to send 
his child to college or to pay his taxes does not consciously reject 
the market price and therefore should be able to recover. Although, 
under Justice Blackmun's approach, the plaintiff in the latter situation 
would be benefited by a rebuttable presumption of reliance, his re- 
covery is best explained under a pure causation approach. If the 
plaintiff sold because he needed money, it would be impossible to 
either prove or disprove reliance on the market price. Thus, putting 
the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption of reliance 
makes it an irrebuttable presumption, and disposition of the matter 
becomes purely a question of causation. 
The pure causation approach makes even more sense when the 
plaintiff is a purchaser because it is even more unlikely that a 
purchaser would consciously reject the market price. A plaintiff who 
knew that the stock price was artificially overvalued generally would 
not be compelled by other reasons to make the purchase. In unusual 
situations, a purchaser might be so taken with a stock that he must 
have it a t  any price, but it would be rare for a plaintiff to admit this 
and rarer still for a defendant to prove it. The short seller, on the 
other hand, is an example of the rare trader who consciously disregards 
the market price. If the trader sells short anticipating a price decline 
that does not occur because of misstatements that artifically overvalue 
the stock, he suffers an injury. He does not rely on the market price 
yet can show causation. In most other situations, a pure causation 
approach would lead to the same results as a reliance-based approach. 
Thus, using causation-based fraud on the market to dispense with 
the reliance requirement courts can ground their decisions upon a 
more appropriate test of liability. 
Justice White, concurring and dissenting in Basic, asserted that 
Justice Blackmun's opinion made it clear that investors who make 
an investment decision without regard to the misrepresentation, but 
who assume that the market price is correct, cannot recover.76 This 
is wishful thinking on Justice White's part; Justice Blackmun never 
74 Id. 
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 995-96 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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:;aid that such investors cannot recover. But Justice White is correct 
in saying that in these instances there is no link, in terms of reliance, 
between the alleged misstatement and the decision to trade at  a fair 
:market price. The link is one of causation, and is broken only by 
defendant's showing that the trader consciously rejected the market 
:price. This further suggests the validity of a pure causation approach. 
The Supreme Court could have acknowledged that rule lob-5 actions 
are basically common law tort claims, required plaintiffs to establish 
reliance, and killed federal securities class actions. This would be 
consistent with its analysis in United States u. C h i ~ r e l l a , ~ ~  which held 
that the rule did not recognize any duty owed to the marketplace in 
general. The Court could have recognized that rule lob-5 actions have 
moved far away from their common law origins and adopted a pure 
causation theory. This would be consistent with the Supreme Court's 
approach in Herman & MacLean u. H ~ d d l e s t o n . ~ ~  Instead, in line 
with the cause of action's muddled development, the Court took a 
wait-and-see approach: let the lower courts wrestle with it some more, 
and then we'll decide what to do. 
A. Blackie's Progeny 
Every Circuit that has considered the form of fraud on the market 
developed in Blackie u. Barrack has adopted it.78 The lower courts 
generally view Blackie as a case involving indirect actual relian~e.~g 
Since most of the decisions involve class certifications, however, the 
courts need not make any final determination of the substantive law.80 
7~ 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). 
77 459 U.S. 375, 387-90 (1983). In Huddleston, the court recognized that rule lob-5 is a more 
expansive remedy than that afforded under common law. 
"See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 
787 F.2d 355, 367 & n.9 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Lipton v. 
Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 ( l l th  Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132, (1985); 
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980) 
(all cases cited in Basic, 108 S. Ct. at  991 n.25). 
rnSee, e.g., Lipton, 734 F.2d at  743; Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 
1283-84 (9th Cir. 1982); Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 307-98 (D. Mass. 
1987); Grossman v. Waste Mgmt. Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Fausett v. 
American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D. Utah 1982). 
"Thus, the courts typically recite that any decision on the merits is inappropriate at  the 
stage of class certification, and therefore they should not address questions of whether reliance 
must be shown and what that reliance must be. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156, 177 (1974); Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722-23 ( l l th  Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988); Guenther v. Pacific Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333 (D. Or. 
1988); In  re IGI Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 451, 456 (D.N.J. 1988); Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., 
121 F.R.D. 135, 138-39 (D. Mass. 1988); Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552 (D. Mass. 1988); 
In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 135 (D.N.J. 1984). 
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1. Applying the Presumption 
a. Well-Developed Markets 
Although the courts recite that Blackie's presumption is only avail- 
able in well-developed, open, or efficient trading markets, very few 
of them have analyzed what this means.81 So long as the securities 
are publicly traded, most courts accept the plaintiff's assertion that 
the market is efficient.B2 Since the question usually is raised on either 
a motion involving class certification or a motion to dismiss, the 
courts frequently state that determination of this issue is inappropriate 
at  that stage of the proceeding.83 Courts have questioned whether the 
following were appropriate situations for application of the presump- 
tion: the market for a stock which was "thin and potentially ~o l a t i l e " ;~~  
the market for American Depository Receipts (ADRS);~~ and the 
market for stock in which there was takeover activity.86 In situations 
involving a corporation's initial public offering, the courts are split 
on whether Blackie is applicable.87 Courts have held that Blackie is 
81 See generally 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 42, 3 8.6(641) (discussing the 
multifarious guises of the efficient trading markets to which the courts have applied fraud on 
the market principles). 
In Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 & n.1 (N.D. 111. 1988), the court found 
the Blackie theory applicable since the issuer was eligible to use Form S-3. In Biben v. Card, 
[1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 92,462 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 1986), the court 
granted class certification, although it recognized defendants' argument that the market for the 
stock was not well developed. It noted that reliance on factors other than market integrity 
might itself be typical of the class, and, in any event, the class could always be decertified at 
a later stage. 
@See,  e.g., Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1987); A&J Deutscher Family 
Fund v. Bullard, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,938 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 22, 1986); Biben, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,462; Abelson 
v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1986); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 
1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
MAbelson, 644 F. Supp. a t  529. 
Reingold, 599 F. Supp. a t  1264. 
rnFinke1 v. O'Brien, No. 85-2539, 1986 WL 15569 (D.N.J. May 22, 1986). 
"In Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 829 (1977), the Ninth Circuit held that purchasers of securities issued under a registration 
statement could rely on the offering price because of their right to rely on the regulatory process 
to ensure the accuracy of the disclosure, id. at  695. The decision has been criticized as an 
unwarranted extension of Blackie. District courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to follow Blackie. 
See In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Fine v. Rubin, 623 F. 
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Other district courts have held that Blackie is not applicable to 
initial public offerings. See Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1984); Gibb v. Delta 
Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1984). Courts have found the Blackie rationale applicable, 
however, if the corporation already has an existing market for its stock. See, e.g., Klein v. A.G. 
Becker Paribas Inc., 109 F.R.D. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer 
Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the court held it was reasonable 
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inapplicable in the marketing of oil and gas limited partnerships,88 
as well as in private  placement^.^^ 
Not surprisingly, it has become common for plaintiffs to plead 
Blackie and Shores in the alternative: either the mirket was well 
developed, or the securities were unmarketable. These efforts, however, 
have been unsuccessful.g0 The combination of approaches apparently 
convinces courts that the plaintiff is really complaining of misstate- 
ments that artificially inflated the value of the security traded in an 
undeveloped market, in which situation plaint& must establish re- 
liance. This reveals one of the anomalies of Blackie's presumption. 
Conventional wisdom holds that it is easier to manipulate the price 
of thinly-traded securities, since the lack of trading volume makes 
stratagems that artificially affect the price more effective. According 
to Blackie, however, if the stock is traded in a well-developed market 
it is appropriate to presume that misstatements will be picked up 
and acted upon by a significant number of traders.g1 The enigma of 
Blackie is this: if the markets are so efficient, why would so many 
traders be so gullible? 
Blackie's presumption can be rebutted by a showing that most 
traders were not deceived by the misinformation, because of its 
inconsistency with other publicly available information, and therefore 
the misinformation did not have an effect on the price.92 One court, 
however, found defendant's attempt to establish this rebuttal "incre- 
dible" because the court felt it put a burden on plaintiffs to seek out 
information other than that supplied by the corporation.93 
to use fraud on the market when dealing with a new issue of rights to purchase stock of a 
publicly-traded corporation, id. at 467-68; see also Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75 
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (raising but not deciding the issue). 
For another case alleging reliance on the regulatory process in a different context, see Mishkin 
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), in which the trustee for 
the liquidation of a broker-dealer firm charged that defendant accounting firm's reckless conduct 
aided and abetted the president's fraudulent transactions. The court held that the complaint 
was not deficient for failing to allege reliance on the broker-dealer's audited financial statements, 
because plaintiff asserted reliance on the regulatory process to assure that broker-dealers are 
solvent. Id. at 273-76. 
=See  Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986), a f d ,  829 F.2d 
13 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1227 (1988). 
nosee  Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1445 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
gosee,  e.g., Lubin, 688 F. Supp. 1425; Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1984). 
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. 
O2 Id. The court also noted that the presumption can be rebutted by proving that the plaintiff 
purchased despite knowledge of the misrepresentations, or that he would have purchased even 
if he had known of the misrepresentation. Id. 
93 In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 637-38 (D.N.J. 1988). 
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b. Necessity of a Scheme 
Some earlier cases held that in the Blackie situation plaintiff must 
allege more than misstatements actionable under paragraph (b) of 
rule 10b-5,94 and must allege a scheme to defraud under paragraphs 
(a) and (c).95 In most cases, however, the courts held that such a 
scheme was sufficiently alleged so long as plaintiff asserted that there 
were misstatements contained in a number of documents issued over 
some period of time, the situation in Blackie itself.96 More recently, 
however, courts have simply dispensed with the distinction between 
a misrepresentation and a fraudulent scheme.97 Hence, the courts 
interpret fraud on the market as a variation of the classic misrepre- 
sentation case, rather than as a market manipulation case, reinforcing 
the view of Bhckie as a case involving indirect actual reliance. 
2. Rebutting the Presumption 
In Bhckie, the Ninth Circuit said that the defendant could rebut 
the presumption by showing that the purchaser knew of the mis- 
statement or would have made the purchase even if he knew of the 
misstatement.98 According to Peil v. Speiser,99 a Third Circuit opinion 
M Rule lob-5 provides as follows: 
I t  shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. $ 240.10b-5 (1988). 
86 See Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 
108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988). Finkel, however, was overruled on this point in Abell v. Potomac Ins. 
Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1119 (5th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. Mar. 
13, 1989) (No. 88-1506); see also Lipton v. Documation Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); In  re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. 
Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In  re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 
F.R.D. 583, 610 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (noting that the fraud on the market "theory works [when] 
plaintiffs have alleged a conspiracy to inflate stock values that runs throughout the class period"). 
See, e.g., Consumers Power, 105 F.R.D. 583. 
07 See Abell, 858 F.2d 1104; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1162 (3d Cir. 1986). 
88 Blockie, 524 F.2d a t  906; cf. Peil, 806 F.2d at  1161, 1163 (rebuttal established if shown that 
"plaintiff would have purchased the stock even a t  the price it would have been at  but for the 
misrepresentations"). 
99 806 F.2d 1154. 
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quoted by Justice Blackmun in Basic,loo such a showing defeats the 
:presumption that the misrepresentations caused an increase in the 
stock's value that induced the plaintiff to make his purchase.1O1 There 
is a distinct difference in tone between Blackie and Peil. In Blackie, 
.the emphasis was on causation and injury: misstatements cause injury 
'because they result in the purchaser's paying too much for the stock. 
The fraud results in injury to all investors in the stock. In Peil, on 
the other hand, the emphasis was on reliance: the misstatements 
caused the price of the stock to rise, and this increase induced the 
:plaintiffs to purchase. The courts frequently express this as protecting 
.the investor's reliance on the stock price as an accurate indication 
of the stock's value.102 The focus is thus on indirect actual reliance. 
The difference between Blackie and Peil is exemplified in a sub- 
sequent Third Circuit opinion, Zlotnick v. TIE Cornrnunication~,~~~ in 
which the court stated that a purchaser who buys at  a fraudulently 
inflated price but actually relies solely upon accurate information in 
purchasing cannot recover, because his bad valuation of the stock is 
independent of any alleged fraud.104 The Third Circuit is apparently 
saying that this investor made his purchase based on factors unrelated 
to price and therefore did not rely on the price. Yet Zlotnick's 
interpretation of "reliance on the price" is not mandated by Blackie 
or even by Peil: a showing that the purchaser did not rely on the 
price is not the same as showing that he would have made the 
purchase if he had known of the misstatement. Therefore, the pre- 
sumption should be rebutted only by a showing that the truth would 
not have made any difference to the particular investor.lO6 
a. Class Certifications 
Typically, defendants in a securities fraud class action seek to block 
certification of the class on the grounds that individual issues of 
reliance make maintenance of a class action impracticable or that 
the named plaintiffs, because of questions about their own reliance, 
or lack of it, are atypical of the class. The courts generally resist 
attempts by defendants to individualize questions of reliance and hold 
"JOBasic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-89 (1988) (citing Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61). 
101 Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161. 
IoZSee, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-43 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
lo3 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988). 
lM Id. at 824. 
lo6See Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 405-06 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
Heinonline - -  52 Alb. L. Rev. 940 1987-1988 
19881 Fraud on the Market 941 
that differences in reliance do not defeat typicality,l06 at  least for 
purposes of class certification.1O7 Nevertheless, if plaintiff's decision 
was based on "factors wholly extraneous to the market,"l08 he will 
be barred from representing the class. Reliance on a source of in- 
formation that was based on the misstatement (actual indirect reli- 
ance) is appropriate conduct for investors, including reliance on a 
broker's recommendati0n10~ or on a financial publication.110 An inves- 
tor who makes his decisions wholly apart from market considerations, 
however, would have his claim barred.lll Similarly, although ordinarily 
- 
lWSee, e.g., In  re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 638-39 (D.N.J. 1988); Priest 
v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 554-55 (D. Mass. 1988); Snider v. Upjohn Co., 115 F.R.D. 536, 
555 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In  re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 116 F.R.D. 216, 222 (D. Minn. 1986). 
For examples of specific plaintiffs whom the court refused to find class action plaintiff ineligible 
to represent the class, see In  re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. a t  633 (plaintiff was a 
more sophisticated investor than other members of the class and purchased some of the stock 
after reading annual report which disclosed substantial losses); Priest, 118 F.R.D. a t  554 (plaintiff 
relied on financial publication and computer program, as well as subjective preferences); see 
also In  re Electro-Catheter Sec. Litig., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
ll 93,643 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 1987) (plaintiff bought shares without concern for corporation's financial 
well-being); Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (plaintiff also 
claimed direct reliance on broker's oral misrepresentation); A&J Deutscher Family Fund v. 
Bullard, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 92,938 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
1986) (plaintiff was sophisticated and made sell decisions on the basis of tax considerations); 
Shamberg v. Ahlstrom, 111 F.R.D. 689 (D.N.J. 1986) (plaintiff represented estate of deceased 
purchaser, and purchaser's reasons for purchasing unknown); Finkel v. O'Brien, No. 85-2539, 
1986 WL 15569 (D.N.J. May 22, 1986) (plaintiff relied on broker); Biben v. Card, [1985-1986 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,462 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 1986) (plaintiff's 
sophistication and contacts with insiders). 
On the other hand, in an individual action with facts strikingly similar to Panzirer v. Wolf, 
663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982) (discussed supra note 49 and 
accompanying text), the district court dismissed a complaint alleging that plaintiff purchased 
the stock because her broker told her a takeover was in the air, because she did not even know 
about the misrepresentations, which would have depressed the price of the stock and thus have 
benefitted her. Augenstein v. McCormick & Co., 581 F. Supp. 452 (D. Md. 1984). 
107 See, e.g., Priest, 118 F.R.D. 552; Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 115 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. 
Pa. 1987). 
lo8The phrase is used in a number of opinions, including Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 
116 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Mass. 1987), and Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 781, 
788 (1984). 
log See, e.g., Ockerman v. King & Spalding, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 7 93,707 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 1988); Klein v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 109 F.R.D. 646, 
650 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Finkel v. O'Brien, No. 85-2539, 1986 WL 15569 (D.N.J. May 22, 1986). 
110 See, e.g., Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
Reported examples of this situation are very sparse. An investor who admitted to making 
his decisions based on astrological signs or the color of the annual report cover would not be 
an appropriate plaintiff. Grossman suggests that a defendant may strengthen his case by showing 
that a particular investor blindly followed the advice of his broker, but this depends upon the 
basis of the broker's advice, Grossman, 589 F. Supp. at 404; see also Masri v. Wakefield, 106 
F.R.D. 322, 325 (D. Colo. 1984) (plaintiff's "unique investment strategy" made him atypical). 
In Koenig v. Benson, 117 F.R.D. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), plaintiff was found to be atypical since 
his investment decision was inexplicable if based on market factors: he testified that he wanted 
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an investor's sophistication or experience does not defeat typicality,ll2 
courts bar as class representatives plaintiffs whom they suspect have 
an investment strategy not primarily based on market factors. Spec- 
ulators, for example, have been held ineligible,ll3 as have plaintiffs 
vvhose investment decisions were apparently based on nonpublic in- 
formation.l14 
1 .  The Short Seller 
An investor who decides that a particular stock is overvalued may 
sell short. However, when the anticipated fall in value does not occur 
because of alleged misstatements, the investor is injured because of 
losses he incurs in covering his short position. Two decisions have 
held that the short seller is not entitled to recover under a fraud on 
tihe market approach, but must establish his own reliance.116 
The Third Circuit, in Zlotnick v. TIE Communications,ll6 empha- 
sized the traditional role of reliance in rule lob-5 actions, and treated 
fraud on the market as simply a presumption of indirect actual 
reliance. Because most investors rely on the market price of the stock 
as an indication of its value and because an increase in the value of 
the stock will induce their purchase, it is appropriate to presume that 
misstatements had this effect. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held 
that the short seller is not entitled to the presumption of reliance.l17 
First of all, the fact of his short sale is evidence that he did not rely 
on the market price as an accurate valuation of the stock. Secondly, 
he did not make his covering purchase because of the increase in the 
ti "safe investment" and that he relied on the advice of his son, yet the published reports with 
which his son was familar made it clear the corporation was not a safe investment. Id. at  337. 
112 See Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552 (D. Mass. 1988); Baum v. Centronics Data 
Computer Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,797 (D.N.H. May 
115, 1986); Biben v. Card, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 92,462 (W.D. 
IMo. Jan. 6, 1986); Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ll 92,298 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 1985). 
H3See, e.g., Koenig, 117 F.R.D. a t  335 (stating that the fact that plaintiff is a sophisticated 
:rpeculator is "irrelevant unless those differences make his claims inconsistent with those of the 
class as a whole"); see Katz, 117 F.R.D. a t  409 (dictum) (evidence did not support allegation 
of speculation, but court discussed speculative behavior as a factor in determining whether 
plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market). 
114 See, e.g., In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 113 F.R.D. 113 (D. Colo. 1986); 
1Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931 (N.D. Ind. 1984). 
Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988); Moelis v. ICH Corp., [I987 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 93,220 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1987). 
116 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988). 
117 Id. at 823. 
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stock's price, but rather in spite of it.118 The court rejected plaintiff's 
argument that while he did not believe the price was an accurate 
reflection of the stock's value at  the time of his short sale, he did 
expect that the market price would correct itself downward by the 
time of his covering transaction119 and that the corporation's alleged 
misstatements interfered with the market's ability to correct itself.120 
In rejecting the causation argument, the court emphasized the dis- 
tinction between a causation-based and a reliance-based theory. It 
correctly observed that the short seller is complaining of a fraud 
perpetrated on the market. Fraud on the market, according to the 
Third Circuit, does not allow a nonrelying trader to recover. Rather, 
all it does is create a presumption that most traders relied on the 
integrity of the market price of the stock.121 Since plaintiff was 
complaining of an injury caused by other investors' reliance, not his 
own, the fraud was perpetrated on the market, not on plaintiff. The 
court took the traditional common law approach, requiring actual 
indirect reliance and refusing to allow recovery to nonrelying traders.122 
Similarly, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Edelman,l23 the court 
rejected the issuer's invocation of fraud on the market in its suit 
against an unwelcome suitor, charging it with misstatements about 
the corporation. Like the short seller, the issuer did not rely on 
information in the marketplace to ascertain the value of its stock.124 
The court said that even if the target corporation could demonstrate 
reliance, it was unlikely that the target could show that its reliance 
was reasonable in view of its superior access to information about 
its own stock.126 In effect, the court said the plaintiff would not be 
allowed to assert that it relied. 
Zlotnick and Burlington Industries are both cases in which the 
courts applied a traditional approach, requiring actual indirect reli- 
118 Id. a t  823-24. 
119 See id. at 823. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
lZ2 Another case dismissed a short seller's complaint for failure to allege reliance and held 
that he was not entitled to bring a fraud on the market claim. Moelis v. ICH Corp., [I987 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 93,220 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1987). Another district 
court, however, has suggested that Basic undercuts the validity of Zlotnick. See In  re Western 
Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 637 (D.N.J. 1988). The court in Western Union noted that 
[wlhile Zlotnick can arguably be seen as a cutting-back on the potential scope of Peil, we 
find its validity somewhat questionable in light of Basic. . . . Not only is Basic a later 
opinion of a superior court, it also makes several positive references to Peil, . . . the scope 
of which Zlotnick arguably constricts. 
Iz3 666 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C. 1987). 
lZ4 Id. a t  807. 
126 Id. 
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ance. Under a pure causation approach, the results may have been 
different with the reliance hurdle eliminated. 
c. Plaintiffs with No Choice 
Also reflecting common law principles on reliance, courts have held 
t:hat plaintiffs who have no choice cannot invoke fraud on the market. 
For example, in Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc.,1Z6 the court 
said that the presumption of reliance is rebutted by showing that the 
truth would not make a difference to the investor. Consequently, a 
plaintiff could not bring a claim based on alleged misstatements in 
a. prospectus in connection with a merger, when she mistakenly 
believed that she had no choice but to accept the shares.12' Similarly, 
in Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.,l28 plaintiff, a minority share- 
holder cashed out in a going-private transaction, had no choice and 
hence reliance could not be presumed. Under traditional reliance 
principles, even if an investor is lied to, he is not injured by the lie 
if he could not have acted differently. However, recovery would be 
allowed under a causation-based theory. 
B. Shores' Progeny 
Despite its weak theoretical justifi~ation,12~ the version of fraud on 
the market originating in Shores v. Sklarl30 remains good law in at  
least three circuits,131 although the Eleventh Circuit recently indicated 
LZe589 F. Supp 395 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
l Z 7  Id. a t  412-13. 
'"578 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Plaintiff's claim that reliance was not necessary was 
based on Affiliated Ute's omissions theory and not on fraud on the market. Id. a t  1060. 
'z9 See Black, supra note 16, at  453. 
'go 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). The judges 
of the Fifth Circuit were split 12-10. 
13' The Shores rationale has been approved by the Fifth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits. See 
itbell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1119 (5th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 
1J.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1989) (No. 88-1506); Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 
1002 ( l l t h  Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 ( l l t h  Cir. 1988); T.J. Raney & Sons, 
1:nc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1026 (1984). 
Various district courts, unguided by their respective circuit courts, have also considered the 
Shores rationale. In Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982), 
the Western District of Virginia accepted the Shores characterization of fraud on the market, 
cmd stated its belief that the Fourth Circuit will adopt fraud on the market a t  some time in 
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it will reexamine the doctrine en banc when it vacated its decision 
in Shores seven years after the en banc decision in the Fifth Circuit.l32 
The Fifth Circuit held that although the purchaser's failure to read 
the offering circular barred his executor from asserting a claim based 
on alleged material misstatements in that document, it did not prevent 
the executor from asserting a claim based on fraud in bringing to 
the market bonds which were unmarketable.l33 If the purchaser was 
willing to purchase any bonds that were "entitled to be marketed" 
and to accept any marketable risk, plaintiff would establish the 
purchaser's reliance on the "integrity of the offerings of the securities 
market.''134 
On remand, the district court denied class certification because 
Shores, as executor of the purchaser's estate, was not a typical class 
representative. The district court interpreted the Fifth Circuit's de- 
cision as limiting the class to purchasers who had not relied on the 
offering circular and who were willing to accept any marketable risk. 
Since both the purchaser and his broker were dead, Shores would 
the future. Id. a t  737. 
In the Seventh Circuit, the Southern District of Illinois, while noting that  Shores has been 
criticized by commentators, nevertheless found its reasoning persuasive. Goldwater v. Alston & 
Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403, 410, 411 (S.D. Ill. 1986) (allegations "that defendants engaged in a 
scheme to  market bonds on the tax exempt bond market, that the sale of the bonds constituted 
a fraud on the tax exempt bond market, that  plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market, 
and as a result of the scheme, plaintiff was damaged" stated a fraud on the market claim); see 
also Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 116 F.R.D. 342, 348-50 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (on motion for class 
certification). 
Lastly, in Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1203 (W.D. Mo. 
1983), the Western District of Missouri (located within the Eighth Circuit) accepted the Shores 
rationale. Rose involved the marketing of bonds which were 
"unsecured or virtually unsecured, . . . issued without any appropriate closing procedure, 
and . . . premised upon a project which was known to be likely if not virtually certain to 
fail . . . indeed appear[ing] to  have been so lacking in basic essentials that, absent a 
fraudulent scheme or plan, . . . would never have been issued or marketed." 
Id. a t  1206. These facts, in conjunction with plaintiff's express allegation of reliance on the 
market, adequately stated a cause of action. Id. 
After the Fifth Circuit's 1981 decision in Shores, 647 F.2d 462, the case was remanded to 
the district court. Id. a t  422. The district court denied class certification, Shores v. Sklar, [1986- 
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 792,874 (N.D. Ala. July 30, 1986). No immediate 
appeal was taken from the denial of class certification, and Shores and the defendants reached 
a settlement. Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485, 1489 ( l l t h  Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 855 
F.2d 722 ( l l t h  Cir. 1988). Subsequently, an  appeal was taken, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the district court's denial of certification. Id. a t  1495. This decision was later vacated, as a 
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was granted. Shores, 855 F.2d 722. 
'33 Shores, 647 F.2d a t  469. The court defined "fraudulently marketed" as involving a fraudulent 
scheme "so pervasive that without i t  the issuer would not have issued, the dealer could not 
have dealt in, and the buyer could not have bought these Bonds, because they would not have 
been offered on the market a t  any price." Id. a t  464 n.2. 
1% Id. a t  469. 
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not be able to establish why the purchaser made the investment.136 
The three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit, in reversing the district 
court's denial of class certification, held that in this situation indi- 
vidual issues of reliance virtually disappear: it did not matter if the 
class consisted of purchasers who read the offering circular, as well 
as those who did not; it did not matter that the executor could not 
show the purchaser's reasons for the purchase; it did not matter 
whether or not the purchaser would accept any marketable risk. 
Virtually all that mattered was the fraud in bringing unmarketable 
bonds to the market.136 
Since the decision of the three-judge panel in the Eleventh Circuit 
has been vacated, the status of Shores in that Circuit is unresolved. 
As the Fifth Circuit's original Shores decision was decided en banc 
by a narrow margin, the doctrine has met strong resistance from the 
outset. 
Shores, and most of the cases following it, involved the offering of 
municipal bonds, which are not subject to the registration require- 
ments of the Securities Act of 1933.l3I Hence, the purchasers of these 
bonds do not have a remedy for misleading statements in the pro- 
spectus under section 11 of the Securities Act.138 Courts thus use the 
Shores approach to transform a claim necessarily based on rule lob- 
5 into the equivalent of a section 11 claim. This observation is borne 
out by the general confinement of Shores to municipal bond offerings. 
Efforts to extend it to other forms of investments have met with 
mixed results. The Eleventh Circuit, in Kirkpatrick u. J.C. Bradford 
135Shores, 11986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ll 92,874, at 94,250. 
136 Shores, 844 F.2d a t  1492-95. 
'3" Municipal bonds are exempted securities. 15 U.S.C. 8 77c(a)(2) (1982). 
1313 Id. 8 77k(a). The issuer of registered securities has virtually absolute liability for material 
misstatements in the registration statement. Section l l(a)(l)  of the Securities Act of 1933 
subjects to civil liability for material untruths or omissions in the registration statement "every 
person who signed the registration statement." Id. 8 77k(a)(l). Section 6(a) of the Securities 
Act requires the issuer to sign the registration statement, id. 8 77f(a), thereby subjecting issuers 
to section 11 liability. See Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 468 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), 
aff'd, 618 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1980). Its only defense is to prove that the purchaser knew the 
truth. Section l l (a)  of the Securities Act provides for liability "unless it is proved that a t  the 
time of such acquisition [the purchaser] knew of such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C. 8 77k(a) 
(1982); see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
Further, the purchaser of registered securities need only show that he relied on the registration 
statement if "the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an earnings statement 
covering a period of a t  least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration 
statement." 15 U.S.C. 8 77k(a) (1982). Even in this case, reliance can be established without 
proof of the reading of the registration statement. Id. "Reliance [can] be shown if [plaintiq 
relied on conversations with persons who knew of the contents of the statement and based 
their opinions on its contents, or if he read articles in newspapers or financial periodicals of 
like import." Rudnick v. Franchard Corp., 237 F. Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
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& Co.,l39 accepted the Shores rationale in a class action against dealers 
who marketed oil limited partnerships, but courts in other circuits 
have rejected it.140 These courts have also declined to apply Shores 
to private placements141 and to exchange offers.142 Nevertheless, as- 
suming the continued viability of Shores, the key questions'are when 
does the presumption apply and how can it be rebutted. 
1. Applying the Presumption 
The original Fifth Circuit opinion identified three factors which 
had to be present. Plaintiff had to allege a fraud or scheme, not just 
misstatements in an offering circular.143 The fraud had to be the 
marketing of bonds which were not entitled to be marketed; it was 
not sufficient if the bonds were simply overpriced.144 These two factors, 
however, coalesced into one: plaintiff must convince the court that 
the misstatements enabled the defendants to sell bonds that otherwise 
could..not be sold. Finally, the purchaser must have been willing to 
accept any marketable risk.146 AS the district court, in denying class 
certification in Shores observed, the last requirement focused attention 
on the purchaser and thus introduced a subjective, individual element 
of proof that jeopardized the utility of the class action.146 Hence, not 
surprisingly, this factor was eliminated in another significant Eleventh 
Circuit decision, which has also recently been vacated, Ross v. Bank 
South, N.A.14' 
Ross involved an offering of tax-exempt bonds. Unlike Shores, 
139827 F.2d 718 ( l l t h  Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988). 
140 See, e.g., Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1063-64 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding Shores inapplicable to limited partnerships not traded on the open 
market), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988). 
141 See Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1446 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Platsis v. E.F. 
Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1227 (1988). 
142 See Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322, 325 (D. Colo. 1984). 
ld3The Shores court indicated that "[tlhe schemes must, of course, be one within the 
'manipulative' condemnation of the securites law." Shores, 647 F.2d a t  470 n.8 (citing Santa 
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)). 
14' Shores, 647 F.2d at 469-70. 
145 Id. a t  470. 
Shores v. Sklar, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 92,874, a t  94,250 
(N.D. Ala. July 30, 1986). 
"I837 F.2d 980 ( l l th  Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 ( l l th  Cir. 1988). 
Subsequent to Ross, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of class certification 
in Shores, relying on Ross' elimination of the reliance on market integrity element. Shores, 844 
F.2d 1485, 1492 ( l l th  Cir. 1988). 
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however, the two plaintiffs purporting to represent the class of pur- 
chasers were alive and could explain why they made the investment. 
Both testified that they would not have purchased the bonds if they 
had been aware of the information contained in the offering circular. 
In addition, one of them stated that he relied on his broker's mis- 
representations. Defendants argued that these statements established 
that plaintiffs did not rely on the integrity of the market and that, 
in fact, they were not willing to accept any marketable risk. According 
to defendants, a willingness to accept any marketable risk meant that 
the purchaser's decision was "based entirely on his individual as- 
sessment of the market as a filtering mechanism and that he would 
have purchased the securities even if he had read the offering cir- 
~ u l a r . " l ~ ~  
In rejecting defendants' argument and dispensing with the "willing 
to accept any marketable risk" factor, the Eleventh Circuit made it 
clear that reliance has been eliminated as an element.149 This follows 
from the conclusion that the sole purpose of reliance is to establish 
causation;160 if plaintiff can establish causation in some other way, 
reliance becomes irrelevant. If he can prove the type of pervasive 
fraud necessary to establish a fraudulent marketing of securities, he 
has satisfied causation, because without the fraud he could not have 
purchased the bonds. There is no need to examine what the purchaser 
would have done if he had read the disclosure document.161 
Thus, the Shores presumption is applicable only if the bonds were 
not entitled to be marketed-i.e., they could not be marketed absent 
fraudulent representations. If the bonds could have been sold without 
the misstatements, they were indeed marketable and plaintiff has 
merely alleged a fraudulent overstatement of value, in which instance 
the plaintiff must establish reliance on the misrepresentation. Ross 
illustrates the difficulty of the distinction, as the Eleventh Circuit 
itself noted.ls2 In Shores, an allegedly safe investment was a "sham"; 
in Ross, however, the bonds were marketed as a risky investment.163 
In principle, as the court noted, this should not make a difference. 
If an investment is unmarketable, it is just as much fraud to pass 
it off as a risky investment as it is a safe one.ls4 Notwithstanding 
Ids Ross, 837 F.2d a t  996-97. 
14@ Id. at 997. 
lS0 See id. at 993-94. 
161 Id. at 994-95. 
162 Id. at  1001-02 ("[wlhether or not the bonds would have been 'marketable' absent the fraud 
is a complex factual inquiry"). 
163 Id. at  999. 
16' Id. The court then explained that the Shores emphasis of " 'fraud on a broader scale,' " 
concerned the fraud's "effect on the marketability of the bond, and not . . . the extent of 
deception." Id. 
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the logical purity of this assertion, the court's review of the evidence 
shows the difficulty in distinguishing between an unmarketable bond, 
i.e., one that could not be sold at  any price, and a risky bond. 
Obviously, there is no clear distinction-it is difference of degree. 
The Ross court said that in distinguishing these securities, the focus 
must not be on who purchases the bonds, but on who sells them. 
The issue is whether bond sellers would have been able to price the 
bonds without fraud at  a price and rate which would attract informed 
buyers.166 
The Fifth Circuit, in upholding the district court's denial of class 
certification in Abell u. Potomac Insurance Co.,156 attempted another 
formulation of what makes investments unmarketable. Similarly al- 
luding to the investment in Shores as a "hoax," the court held that 
bonds were "not entitled to be marketed" only if the promoters knew 
that the enterprise was patently worthless. In Abell, plaintiffs could 
not establish this because these bonds always had a legitimate value 
in the bond market, even after all the unfavorable information about 
the project was known.l6' 
2. Rebutting the Presumption 
If plaintiff establishes that defendants offered unmarketable se- 
curities, defendants seldom will be able to escape liability. Because 
the fraud caused the purchasers' injury, rarely will there be an 
intervening factor significant enough to break the chain of causation.168 
In Kirkpatrick u. J.C. Bradford & Co.,l69 the Eleventh Circuit held 
that class action treatment is not precluded by the possibility that 
some purchasers might have relied on factors other than the integrity 
Id. a t  1002. 
lW858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). 
IK7 Id. at 1122. 
168 See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 42, 8 8.6(662), a t  &828 (noting that in 
a Shores situation, though the presumption is theoretically rebuttable, such a rebuttal is difficult 
for the defendant to show because the defendant "cannot show that his or her fraud did not 
affect the market price on which the presumption operates"); see also Ross, 837 F.2d a t  995 
(distinguishing the rebuttal of Shores from that of Blackie, noting that "[iln a Blackie type 
case, the defendant can show that his fraud had no effect on the market price . . . [while a] 
Shores defendant can make no such showing . . . because his fraud creates the [security] itself" 
(citation omitted)). 
169827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987). Kirkpatrick extended the Shores theory to include securities 
other than municipal bonds (oil limited partnerships) and brokers and dealers as well as issuers 
as defendants. Id. 
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of the market.160 In Ross, the Eleventh Circuit took an additional 
step in holding that the purchaser is entitled to recover so long as 
he did not intentionally refuse to investigate known or obviously 
apparent risks associated with the bonds.161 Unless defendant can 
show a compelling reason, such as the purchaser's inside information 
or his unreasonable failure to investigate, defendant cannot rebut the 
presumption that investors rely on the integrity of the market to 
produce bonds which are entitled to be marketed. 
C. Fraud on the Market as Market Manipulation 
1. Market Manipulation Generally 
Fraud on the market, in some cases, is used as a synonym for 
market manipulation. The statement that a trader is entitled to rely 
on the integrity of the market is the equivalent of saying that a 
trader may suffer injury when the market or price for a stock is 
tampered with. Accordingly, he may have a claim against dealers that 
created an artificial price and an artificial market.162 
Whether market manipulation claims form a separate category of 
fraud on the market claims is far from clear. Despite the fact that 
section 10(b) prohibits manipulative as well as deceptive devices, 
market manipulation has received curiously little attention in the 
private claims under rule lob-5. The Supreme Court has articulated 
a narrow definition of market manipulation, referring to it as "virtually 
a term of art"163 and limiting it to the acts described in section 9 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16'I Accordingly, if statements 
that artificially affect stock prices do not constitute manipulation 
under section 9, they must be deceptive, and, arguably, reliance is 
required. The Fifth Circuit took this position in Chemetron Corp. v. 
Business Funds, Inc.,l66 asserting that when a section 10(b) claim 
involved market manipulation accomplished by fraudulent misstate- 
Id. at 723 (noting that the "Shores fraud-on-the-market . . . makes virtually irrelevant 
the possibility that the various purchasers may have relied on different representations regarding 
the desirability of the particular security"). 
lB1 ROSS, 837 Fi2d at 997. 
lBZSee Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 609 F. Supp. 499, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
le3See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). 
lasee 15 U.S.C. 5 78i (1982). 
718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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ments, the plaintiff must establish reliance.166 Other cases besides 
Shores, however, have emphasized the rule's dichotomy between mis- 
statements and fraudulent schemes in finding that plaintiff did not 
have to show reliance when complaining of an injury caused by a 
scheme that artificially affected stock prices.16' 
2. Brokers and Market Manipulation 
In cases involving charges of market manipulation allegedly per- 
petrated principally by dealers in the stock, courts have split on 
whether fraud on the market is applicable outside the Blackie or 
Shores context.16& The facts in most of these cases are the antithesis 
lmSee id. a t  728. 
Is7 The most famous of these are Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), and Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 
480 F.2d 341, 373-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), which are discussed in Black, 
supra note 16, a t  445-46. 
'@In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Ohio 1986), the district court 
applied fraud on the market against defendant brokers. Careful to qualify itself, however, the 
court made it clear that it was not saying "that '[alny broker who makes a material misre- 
presentation or omission concerning a nationally traded security could be liable to every person 
who subsequently purchases that security whether or not a customer,' " but instead "only that 
a plaintiff may allege liability where the purported fraud is so broad that it infected the market 
place and distorted the stock price." Id. a t  597 (quoting Defendant's Reply Memorandum at  
27) (citation omitted). Further, the court limited the class of plaintiffs to those who "dealt 
with" the defendant, because they "were more likely than other purchasers on the open market 
to rely on [the broker's representations]." Id. The court additionally noted as relevant to the 
application of fraud on the market to plaintiff's allegation that defendant's position as "a major 
brokerage house known to have multiple ties with [the issuer] and information about [the 
issuer's] financial condition . . . had a significant impact on the market price" of the securities 
in issue. Id. In Bresson v. Thompson McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 92,855 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1986), the Southern District Court of New 
York recognized that reliance on the "integrity of the market" was sufficient to defeat a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead fraud. Id. a t  
94,158. Bresson involved an action by investers against their brokers for, inter alia, alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions concerning the quality of certain limited partnership interests 
which plaintiffs had purchased through defendants. Id. at 94,157. 
In Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 480 (D. Minn. 1987), the court found fraud 
on the market applicable to this action against brokers to the extent that plaintiffs did not 
have "direct contact with the [broker] and [did not] base assertions of liability 'on affirmative 
misrepresentations made to [them] personally.' " Id. at 485 (quoting McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades 
& Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 341 (N.D. 111. 1982)). This is inapposite to the reasoning of Shpiro,  
which required that the plaintiffs had "dealt with" the defendant. Shpiro,  634 F. Supp. a t  
597. 
The court in Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 F.R.D. 880 (D.N.J. 1984), however, "seriously 
question[ed] the relevance of a 'fraud-on-the-market' theory to a lawsuit against a stockbroker 
rather than against the issuer of the stock," id. at 890 n.5, but did not rule on the issue. Platsis 
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), 
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of the Blackie pattern since, like the classic market manipulation 
case, the securities are ordinarily thinly traded and involve initial 
offerings or other situations involving less reliance on the market as 
a price indicator.169 They also do not fit within Shores because the 
allegation is an artificial~inflation of value, not utter wor th les~ness ,~~~  
and they do not involve revenue bonds. In the cases applying fraud 
on the market against the dealers, the courts have emphasized that 
the securities firm disseminated the misstatements widely and that 
it had substantial involvement in the company's financial affairs.171 
Conversely, cases rejecting its application have emphasized that the 
misstatements were disseminated by the account representative, not 
as the firm's uniform policy, and that the brokers had personal 
relationships with the customers.172 In cases involving not only mis- 
representations but also conduct that affected the market price, courts 
have been more receptive to allowing the claim without requiring 
reliance. For example, in Gavron v. Blinder Robinson & C O . , ~ ~ ~  the 
dealer allegedly sought to depress the price of the stock, not only by 
making misstatements, but also by refusing to solicit purchase orders, 
and when it accepted purchase orders from customers, it delayed 
execution, anticipating a reduced price.174 Thus, when broker-dealer 
firms act institutionally to affect market prices, it is appropriate to 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1227 (1988), involved a suit by an investor against his broker based on 
the broker having committed a fraud on the market by "knowingly or recklessly [having] sold 
'junk,' " limited partnerships that were only marketable "because [defendant] sold them." Id. 
a t  1300. The court found fraud on the market inapplicable because the securities in issue were 
"not purchased on an open market," but through a private placement. Id. at 1301. Apparently, 
in the absence of an open market transaction, this court would not apply the theory against a 
broker. See id. 
169 See, e.g., Bresson, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 92,855, at 94,152 
to 94,153 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1986) (initial offering of oil and gas limited partnerships); Platsis, 
642 F. Supp. at 1301 (private placement of limited partnership interests). 
l1OSee, e.g., Nelsen, 659 F. Supp. a t  482 (plaintiff alleging defendant's fraudulent conduct 
impacted on market price); Platsis, 642 F. Supp. 1277; Shapiro, 634 F. Supp. at 597 (theory 
applicable when broker's actions "distort the stock price"). 
See, e.g., Nelsen, 659 F. Supp. at 482; Shapiro, 634 F. Supp. at 597. In Nelsen, defendant 
broker who underwrote previous issuance of common stock "was a market-maker in common 
stock, and provided financial consulting and investment banking services" for the issuer, was 
present a t  board meetings "and was also party to confidential information and deliberations of 
[the issuer's] directors. Nelsen, 659 F. Supp. a t  482. Similarly, in Shapiro, defendant broker 
had many ties with the issuer, possessing information concerning its financial condition. It was 
alleged that the defendant was a creditor of the issuer, a seller of the issuer's premium deferred 
annuities as well as issuer's investment analyst. Shupiro, 634 F. Supp. a t  597. 
'12See, e.g., Plats& 642 F. Supp. 1277; Seiler, 102 F.R.D. 880. In Seiler, the court seriously 
questioned the applicability of fraud on the market in a suit against brokers rather than the 
issuer. Id. at 890-91 n.5. 
'I3 115 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
'I4 Id. a t  320. 
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adopt the causation approach because the firms are affecting the 
prices their customers must accept. 
3. Proxy Statements and Market Manipulation 
It has long been recognized that plaintiffs who received a misleading 
proxy solicitation in connection with a merger are not barred from 
asserting the claim even though they did not rely on the alleged 
misstatement.175 These cases emphasize that the injury is suffered by 
the group and that a shareholder can be injured because of the 
reliance of others.176 In Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial 
Corp.,177 for example, the court held that plaintiffs could represent 
the class of shareholders solicited to vote on a merger with another 
bank, even though they knew of the alleged material omission (merger 
overtures) from other published sources178 and in fact voted against 
the merger.179 Keyser thus continues a line of "pure causation" cases 
which hold that shareholders whose votes are solicited to approve a 
merger can complain of misstatements in the proxy materials dis- 
seminated to obtain shareholder approval.l@J 
17=See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir.) ("to the extent a 
reliance factor is required, in the present context it is encompassed by the finding that the 
misrepresentation was material"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). Compare id. with Crane 
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that in a case 
involving nondisclosure of manipulation proof of individual reliance need not be shown), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). 
Some courts have characterized cases involving fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions 
in proxy statements as a third category of fraud on the market. See Frankel v. Wyllie & 
Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 735-40 (W.D. Va. 1982), cited in Rose v. Arkansas Valley 
Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1201 n.34 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 
Crane Co., 419 F.2d a t  797 (" '[wlhat must be shown is that there was deception which 
misled [other] stockholden and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury' ") 
(quoting Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
970 (1968)). 
177 121 F.R.D. 642 (M.D. Pa. 1988). 
178 Id. at  647-48. The court did not discuss whether the presumption of reliance is negated 
by "dissemination of more complete and accurate information in the press." Id. at  647 n.11. 
Another court found it "incredible" that defendant could make such an argument. In  re Western 
Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 638 (D.N.J. 1988). 
The court in In  re Kulicke and Soffa Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 
1988), on the other hand, found it especially logical in a fraud on the market case to take into 
account other information in the marketplace. The latter approach is correct, although, in the 
context of proxy solicitations, a persuasive argument can be made that the solicitees who make 
a personal decision to vote based on direct solicitation are not affected by information outside 
the proxy materials. 
Keyser, 121 F.R.D. at  648. 
'80Mi11s V. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). For an analysis of this decision and 
its place with the development of fraud on the market, see Black, supra note 16, a t  442-44. 
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In proxy solicitation cases, courts have recognized that an investor 
is injured by the reliance of other traders and should recover despite 
a lack of reliance by the investor. This line of cases represents a 
chipping away of the well-entrenched, yet practically useless reliance 
requirement. Although this recognition can be the basis for the 
expansion of fraud on the market as a pure causation approach, these 
cases are traditionally explained as reflecting a favored treatment for 
recipients of proxy solicitation materials. 
Fraud on the market is a phrase, not a theory. The lower courts 
most frequently use it to confer upon plaintiff a rebuttable pre- 
sumption of reliance. This is reliance-based fraud on the market. The 
Supreme Court in Basic Inc. u. Levinson, while acknowledging this 
use of fraud on the market, did not, by its use of this reliance 
approach, rule out the possibility that fraud on the market might 
have useful application under a pure causation approach. In fact, 
Justice Blackmun made it clear he was not assessing the general 
validity of the theory. Notwithstanding Justice White's dissenting 
views to the contrary, the Court did not reject the notion of causation- 
based fraud on the market. 
If the explanation for fraud on the market is that it establishes a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance, then it fails to explain the ap- 
plication of the label to cases which can only be explained on a pure 
causation theory. In Shores, in some actions against dealers, and in 
proxy solicitation cases, the pure causation approach is followed. 
Shores u. Sklar, however, had a controversial beginning and its future 
is very much in doubt because of the criticism that fraud on the 
market should not be applied in undeveloped market situations. The 
use of causation-based fraud on the market in the proxy solicitation 
area has been confined to that fact pattern. The most interesting 
development in causation-based fraud on the market is its application 
in actions against dealers that involve allegations more closely related 
to market manipulation than to fraudulent misstatements. To date, 
however, a coherent approach has not emerged from the various 
situations in which this pure causation approach to fraud on the 
market has been used. 
In open market transactions, in which the price is set by other 
traders and the trader must accept that price, a forthright elimination 
of the reliance requirement is logical. The individual reasons behind 
an investment decision are not relevant. Once the decision to trade 
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is made, the investor becomes subject to the market's pricing mech- 
anism, which causes him injury unless there is something unique to 
the individual investor that breaks the chain of causation. An added 
benefit of adopting this approach is that courts and commentators 
alike can dispense with the nonsensical reliance rules which have 
resulted from the perceived necessity of paying lip service to an out- 
of-place element borrowed from common law. 
There is less justification for the pure causation approach in the 
context of initial public offerings, since the price is not set by other 
traders. Because the impetus for the Shores decisions is the well- 
founded judicial perception that the purchasers of revenue bonds 
should be entitled to some minimal assurance that the market offers 
protection against sham investments, the best way of providing for 
this would be for legislative enactment of an explicit remedy for 
purchasers of revenue bonds comparable to section 11 of the Securities 
Act of 1933. 
Of the two ways in which fraud on the market can be used to deal 
with the difficulty or impracticability of proving reliance in rule 10b- 
5 cases, the pure causation approach emerges as the more sensible 
and useful alternative. Applying fraud on the market as simply a 
means of dispensing with the reliance requirement in certain situations 
would lead to a more logical and predictable approach to several of 
the situations discussed. 
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